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Initial needs of sector specific regulation
In the process of privatising public monopolies, the
EU Commission is pursuing policy reforms that are
advancing both the standardisation of institutional
and regulatory frameworks and the creation of com-
petition-oriented European utility markets. Existing
monopolies have to be dissolved as a precondition to
opening up the markets. From the 1980s onwards
numerous reforms have been instigated in the con-
viction that competition would lead to an improve-
ment in service offerings in terms of both price and
technology. The international telecommunications
industry has been affected by these reforms from the
very beginning.
The transition from a monopoly market to a com-
petitive market in telecommunications has been
fraught with problems:
• The former monopolist (incumbent) owned all
essential rights – e.g., the access to the customer
through the local loop. The introduction of com-
petition was thus connected with interventions in
property rights.
• The dominance of the incumbent would have
allowed for various abuses of market power – be
it through pricing strategies or the specification of
technical requirements.
• Investments in this market are asset specific, i.e.,
they cannot be used otherwise. New competitors
will only consider the risk of sunk cost if frame-
work conditions for an investment are promising.
• Networks are characterised by significant exter-
nalities. The utility of a communication network
depends on the number of accessible subscribers.
At the moment of liberalisation all subscribers
were still in the incumbent’s network. Compe-
titors only had a chance if they were granted
access to this network.
• Significant asymmetries existed regarding the
information of market participants. Bilateral con-
tracts would probably have been incomplete,pric-
ing agreements problematic.
• Telecommunication services imply non-economic
objectives like universal service and the consider-
ation of social interest.
These initial problems could not be solved by the
application of general competition law, which is typ-
ically applied after a detection of abuse (ex post);
they require sector specific “ex ante” regulation.
To solve these problems, independent regulatory
authorities with the power to enact sector-specific
regulations were set up in most countries for the pur-
pose of overseeing the transition. In the Inter-
connection Directive,European authorities specified
that sector-specific regulation would be a transition-
al measure:“When effective competition is achieved
in the market the competition rules of the Treaty will
in principle be sufficient to monitor fair competition
ex-post.”1 In response to repeated allegations of
excessive bureaucracy, the European Commission
stressed in 1999 that they were working to create a
regulatory regime “which can be rolled back as com-
petition strengthens, with the ultimate objective of
controlling market power through the application of
Community competition law.”2 The current 2006
review of the telecommunications regulatory frame-
work also adheres to the transitory character of reg-
ulation:“The regulatory regime is designed to phase
out regulation progressively as effective competition
is established.”3
New developments and problems
In the meantime, general economic conditions have
changed drastically from the initial situation at the
end of the 1990s: intense competition in all telecom-
* In a prior study at the beginning of the European liberalisation
process, the Ifo Institute analysed the organisation of selected reg-
ulatory authorities:The Ifo Institute and the Centre for European
Integration Research published an initial study comparing the legal
framework of regulation of telecommunications markets (Libera-
lisierung der Telekommunikationsordnungen – Ein Rechtsvergleich
2000).This report continues the earlier work and includes an inter-
national comparison of regulatory institutions.The complete study
is available in German. The Ifo Institute is grateful to Deutsche
Telekom AG for providing initial financing for this study.
** Hans Schedl is senior economist at the Ifo Institute for
Economic Research at the University of Munich.
1 97/33/EC, Recital 25.
2 COM (1999) 539 final, Section 4.7 (Specific Competition Issues).
3 See COM (2006).munication markets, rapid technological develop-
ment with ever-shorter innovation cycles and
amended laws now characterise the decision-making
environment of national regulatory authorities.
International markets have been marked by falling
prices, an increasing number of competitors and the
loss of market share by the former monopolist
(incumbent; Figure 1).
New technologies (e.g., Next Generation Networks,
IP, VDSL) are providing additional fuel for far-
reaching changes in electronic communications.
International analysts and market observers like
Goldman Sachs predict that this trend will continue
undiminished over the next few years, leading to
additional business losses for the incumbents
(Figure 2).
The influence of changing markets and increasing
competition in telecommunications on the institu-
tional structure of these authori-
ties4 are analysed in this article.
The question arises as to whether
these extremely dynamic and
innovative processes in the
telecommunications sector were
accompanied by institutional
adjustments of national regulato-
ry authorities – adjustments that
will eventually lead to market
supervision by general competi-
tion authorities. The underlying
study (Schedl and Sülzle 2007)
explored that question empiri-
cally as part of a review of insti-
tutions in eleven countries (Aus-
tralia, Germany, Finland, France,
the UK, Italy, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, Spain and
Hungary). It provides an over-
view of the current state of struc-
tures of international regulatory
institutions for telecommunica-
tions markets against the back-
ground of competitive situation.
The study examines the charac-
ter of regulation and observable
successes, e.g. the increasing
number of competitors, market
shares and falling prices. At the
same time, it identifies new problem areas apparent
in the regulated telecommunications sector: falling
investment and lagging innovation in network infra-
structure.
More than eighty annual reports were analysed for the
study. Regulation experts were interviewed by tele-
phone: employees of the regulatory authorities and
ministries, as well as independent researchers well
versed in matters of regulation. The interviews were
based on a guideline developed by the Ifo Institute.
National regulatory agencies
Regulatory tasks
Among the eleven selected countries five different
structures regarding regulatory tasks can be dis-
cerned (Table 1):













Source: OECD, Communications Outlook, (2005).





















 Incumbents' fixed revenues
Ø EBITDA
a) British Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, France Telecom, KPN, Telecom Italia, Telefónica.
Source: Goldman Sachs, European Telecoms, (2007), Credit Outlook.
ESTIMATED DEVELOPMENT OF REVENUES AND EBITDA OF SIX 
EUROPEAN INCUMBENTS
a) IN THE NATIONAL FIXED NETWORK
 bn. €  %
estimated
Figure 2
4 These authorities often have other, sta-
tistically inseparable, tasks.CESifo DICE Report 4/2007 37
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• Telecommunication and broadcasting regulation
exists in Australia, Italy, Switzerland and the UK.
• Telecommunication and postal regulation is prac-
tised in France, Sweden and Hungary.
• Finland and the Netherlands have a mixed form
of these models with reduced regulation of broad-
casting.
• In Germany energy and rail regulation have been
added to the tasks of telecommunication and
postal regulation.
• Regulation in Spain is limited to the fixed network.
During the last ten years there have been several
task extensions: the merger of broadcasting and
radio communication with telecommunication regu-
lation in the UK (2003) and Australia (2005), the
inclusion of postal regulation in France (2005) and of
energy and rail regulation in Germany (2006).
Modifications were made as a
result of increasing obligations
for the review of EU member
states regarding market analysis
and the examination of signifi-
cant market power. Organisatio-
nal modifications and extensions
make it difficult to compare
telecommunication regulations.
They have led to significant in-
creases in employment.
Employment
The size and development of
employment in national regula-
tory agencies differ considerably. Roughly three
types of size can be discerned (Table 2):
• Agencies with very high employment in Germany
and the UK.
• Those with employment figures between 300 and
500 (Switzerland, Netherlands, Australia and
Hungary) and
• Agencies with comparably low employment
(Sweden, Italy, Finland, France and Spain).
These figures may, in several cases, be misleading as
some employees with regulatory influence have
remained in ministries (e.g.in France,Italy or Spain).
The growth rates indicate a largely increasing trend
in employment. A clear decrease was only evident
for Germany,which,in our opinion,is linked to posts






Frequencies Competition  Content
Energy Rail
Australia (X)* (X)* X X X 
UK X X  X  X  X 
Switzerland X  X  X X X 
Italy X X  X  X  X 
Finland X  X  X  X  X 
Netherlands X  X  X  X 
France X X  X 
Sweden X X  X 
Hungary X X  X 
Germany X X  X  X  X 
Spain X (X)**
(X)* = Price- and access regulation in the competency of the competition authority; (X)** = not yet founded.
 Source: Country reports of the NRAs.
Table 2 
Number of employees (2005) and their growth (1999–2005)
Employment
100–250 300–500 >500 >2,000
Growth












 Source: Country reports and OECD DSTI/ICCP/TISP(2005)6/FINAL.agency.For three countries growth rates could not be
calculated.
Advisory boards
Organisation charts reflect, as expected, flat struc-
tures for most of the smaller agencies – an exception
is the French agency. Typically, mid-sized and large
agencies additionally resort to institutionalised
external advisory boards.These boards provide addi-
tional expert knowledge and contribute to stabilising
the institution (Table 3).
Financing
With respect to financing, the agencies can be
grouped into roughly three categories.Agencies with
• Nearly complete funding provided by contribu-
tions and charges passed on to the industry:
Finland, Germany, Hungary, Netherlands
(OPTA) and Spain.
• Mixed funding provided by industry fees and
appropriation: Italy, Netherlands (AT), Sweden,
Switzerland and UK.
• Nearly complete funding provided by appropria-
tion:Australia and France.
Measurement problems
The data collection revealed several problems in mea-
suring telecommunication regulation.Observable were
• Imprecise  measurements: The merger of parts of
the Federal Post Ministry and the Agency of Post
and Telecommunication as the national regulator
in Germany resulted, compared internationally,
in the creation of a large institution (about 2,500
employees). Only about 300 persons are actually
involved in telecommunication regulation.
• Other organisations that influence regulation: In
several countries ministerial departments with an
influence on regulation continue to exist (e.g.
France,Italy,Netherlands,Spain).In Australia the
tasks of price and access control are under the
competency of the competition authority. It was
only possible to include in our data the figures for
the Netherlands from the department of radio-
communication.
• Missing information or missing details: This
applies to employment and budget information in
several countries.
• Conflicting information in different sources:
Information on price and market share showed
significant differences between OECD and EU
sources.
This underlines the necessity for further research.
Institutional theory is used to analyse the changes
that have taken place. They impute a generally high
level of inertia for public institutions and postulate
that state institutions use increasingly detailed inter-
pretations of their mission or additional areas of com-
petence they have acquired as evidence of their
necessity to exist.The objective of this long-term pro-
ject is the description of the institutional character of
regulatory authorities and their introduction into the
debate on European regulatory requirements.
Working hypotheses
Institutional theory led us to the formulation of the
following hypotheses:
• Persistency: Regulatory authorities are not differ-
ent from other public institutions. Once estab-
lished, they are not easily dismantled. The aboli-
tion of tasks is compensated by an expansion of
remaining tasks or the creation of new ones.
• Low adaptability: Regulatory authorities are cha-
racterised by an inbuilt moment of inertia. The
assimilation of changing general conditions (e.g.,
technology, innovations) occurs, if at all, with sig-
nificant delay. Changing tasks lead to enlarge-
ment in the case of new tasks and limited trans-
fers in the case of expanded ones. The develop-


















1, 2, 3, 4 = Number of boards. – X = Institutional
ised boards.
 Source: Country reports and NRA reports.CESifo DICE Report 4/2007 39
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ment of competition or a
changing market environment
has no repercussions on the
development of personnel in
regulation.
• Limited influence on organi-
sation: The possibilities for
influencing cutbacks or the




Despite a strong increase in the
intensity of competition in tele-
communications markets after
ten years of complete liberalisation, sector-specific
regulation has  not been phased out in favour of gen-
eral competition law in any of the European coun-
tries studied. Falling prices, an increasing number of
competitors, and the incumbents’ loss of market
share have led to reduced regulation in some areas,
but any definite renunciation of regulation tied to
success factors remains to be seen. On the contrary,
ten years after the “transitory” introduction of regu-
lation, structure-preserving behaviour, e.g., an
expansion in regulatory scope and responsibility, a
boost in personnel, and higher budgets for the
authorities in question (Figure 3), can be observed.
Current analysis in selected countries shows that
new, increasingly sophisticated regulation mecha-
nisms, e.g., the procedures for the determination of
significant market power (SMP,Article 14) and mar-
ket analysis (Article 16), have been introduced.5
Both increasing specialisation and an increasing ten-
dency for regulatory authorities to take their place
next to existing supervisory organisations as equals
with their own distinct identities were observed.
These findings are consistent with institutional theo-
ry. Further observations are:
• Current trends show that personnel expansion at
regulatory authorities predominates internation-
ally. Measured by the number of employees,
employment increased by an average of more
than 60 percent between 1999 and 2005. This
increase is largely due to the establishment and
strengthening of the regulatory authorities in
their institutional environments.
• On average, the selected European regulatory
authorities employed about 518 employees in
2005.Although Germany authorities lost employ-
ees against the overall trend (– 9.4 percent), total
employment was at 2,358 (2005) employees,more
than 600 percent above the average employment
level of the regulatory authorities in the other ten
countries. Given this order of magnitude, it seems
unlikely that the reduction in workforce is a result
of a shrinking scope of regulatory duties.6 It
should be noted, however, that the employment
figures may not reflect total employment in regu-
lation.7 It can be assumed that the figures would
be modified if the authorities were to provide
information on the number and qualifications of
the employees who work specifically on telecom
market regulation issues.8
• The theory of persistent institutions is equally
supported by the development of the scope of
activity of regulatory authorities.
• The analysis of eleven regulatory institutions
leads us to the conclusion that the goal of a tran-
sitional, sector-specific regulation, which would
be reassigned to general competition law, is not
fixed in the objectives and/or the corresponding












a) Excluding Hungary.    b) Unweighted averages from national long-distance and international calls 
(German trends show that these also apply to local call) of ten countries.
Source: Country Reports; OECD, Communications Outlook (2005); Estimation of the Ifo Institute.
employment
index 1999 = 100
average shares incumbents
in %
CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT INDEX OF SELECTED REGULATORY 
AGENCIES
a) AND AVERAGE MARKET SHARES
b) OF THE INCUMBENT 
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
dashed line is estimated
Figure 3
5 Directive 2002/21/EG of the European Parliament and of the
Council dated 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework
for electronic communications networks and services (Framework
Directive).
6 A much more likely scenario: this is an isolated effect of “limited-
duration positions”.
7 In some countries, there are still ministry departments that have
complete regulatory power (such as AT in the Netherlands) or
affect regulation (such as STSI and MEN in France).
8 E.g. at Germany’s Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagen-
tur), about 300 employees are estimated to be directly involved
with telecommunications regulation.concrete specifications for phasing out regulation
de lege lata in the individual member states.
• The increased workload resulting from the EU
regulatory framework has led to organisational
adaptation on the part of the authorities, but there
is still no sign that work is being shifted inside the
regulatory authorities to new assignments.9
• In the face of a significant increase in competition,
employment trends indicate that regulatory au-
thorities have a low ability to adapt with respect to
the gradual phasing out of regulation. However,
one should keep in mind that different national
regulatory institutions have varying amounts of
freedom to act as they wish. The state’s ability to
shape and guide these institutions differs due to
factors such as differing financing models for var-
ious authorities as well as differing civil service
regulations and levels of protection from dis-
missal. The growing requirements of the EU
Commission are probably a major factor as well.
• Generally it can be observed that regulatory insti-
tutions with a stronger element of self-financing
(through fee revenue, etc.) have more leeway in
their decision-making on organisational matters
than authorities that depend predominantly on
appropriation.Institutional theory would give the
former authorities a better chance of breaking
free and establishing themselves as separate enti-
ties over the long term than the latter group,
which is more tightly controlled by government.
• Marked cross-relationships with institutionalised
advisory bodies (as in Germany and France) or
consumer organisations (as in Australia and the
UK) support the regulators’ ability to influence
economic and competition-related policy. This
creates an ever larger and closely-knit network of
co-operation between the state and regulatory
authorities, where network members sound the
alarm for each other when structural intervention
(e.g., in the form of budget cuts) threatens.
Undoubtedly, the competition sparked by regula-
tion has created significant benefits for consumers.
The initial goal of competing infrastructure pro-
viders was replaced by price competition within the
existing telecommunications infrastructure. New
broadband and next-generation network (NGN)
technologies will further change the conditions of
competition.10
Against this backdrop, the initial objective of self-
supporting competition and supervisory agencies
that restrict themselves to control and remedy abuse
should not be abandoned. The currently observable
degree of differentiation and the increasing scope of
regulation, as well as the increasingly labour-inten-
sive design of regulatory processes do not serve this
objective. Given the results of this study, the latest
call for centralisation of important regulatory func-
tions at the European Commission is equally uncon-
vincing,all the more so as competition and prices are
pointing in the desired direction in the member
states. It would be far better to focus again on the
politically mandated transitory character of sector-
specific regulation within a market economy regime.
This study was conceived as the first step towards a
systematic status report. In the course of collecting
and analysing the data, it became clear that more
information is needed. In the hope that regulatory
authorities will be willing to provide information,we
will strive to describe more precisely their missions
and structures in the future. With this pilot project,
the Ifo Institute seeks to contribute to the discussion
and provide an impetus for research papers that
could, for example, empirically investigate the con-
nection between market development and institu-
tional change.
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